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I. INTRODUCTION
In a world governed by the principles of state sovereignty
and non-interference in internal affairs, few effective methods
exist to make countries comply with their international
obligations, including obligations to respect fundamental labor
rights.' The framework for a Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) provides one of those few methods by linking trade and
labor standards. GSPs were first implemented in the 1970s by
the United States, the European Union and other countries in
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1. See generally Yaraslau Kryvoi, Enforcing Labor Rights Against
Multinational Corporate Groups in Europe, 46 INDUS. REL. 366 (2007) (discussing
limited effectiveness of corporate codes of conduct and litigating labor rights in
domestic courts in civil and common-law jurisdictions).
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an effort to stimulate exports from developing countries.2 Under
GSP, developing and transition countries receive additional
trade preferences, but these preferences can be withdrawn in
certain cases.' This includes for violations of core labor
standards.'
In order to predict the effectiveness of linking trade and
labor standards, it is crucial to understand the reasons why
countries disrespect core labor standards. The three most
important reasons are economics, politics, and lack of resources.
The main economic reason is fear that compliance will raise the
cost of labor and deter foreign investment. Political reasons
come into play when governments violate core labor standards
to achieve certain political purposes-for instance, by
preventing workers from organizing into independent trade
unions in order to block their participation in political activities.
Finally, violations of core labor rights can occur in countries
that do not have control over their territories and where the rule
of law is nonexistent or very weak. The main contribution of
this Article is that it suggests for the first time the importance
of distinguishing between economic and political justifications
for violating fundamental labor rights. This distinction has
practical implications in deciding how to deal with countries
that violate these and other human rights standards and in
assessing the effects the sanctions will have.
Under the European Union's GSP, European Union
member states reserve the right to withhold preferential trade
treatment as a sanction for improper labor practices. The
European Union's GSP has existed since the 1970s, but only
twice has it been applied as a tool for linking trade to labor:
against Myanmar in 1997 for the use of forced labor, and
against Belarus in 2006 for violations of the freedom of
association. Although linking trade and labor standards has
recently become a hot topic,' little has been written on how the
European Union implements its GSP. This Article attempts to
fill this gap by analyzing the recent developments and the
effectiveness of linking labor standards to trade under European
2. See, e.g., Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private
Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 203 (2007).
3. See, generally, Lance Compa & Jeffrey Vogt, Labor Rights in the
Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 COMi. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
199 (2001).
4. Id.
5. See id.
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law.
Although scholars have argued that the European Union
has not resorted to withdrawing countries from the GSP for
political purposes,6 my analysis of the cases of Belarus and
Pakistan suggests otherwise. It shows that various factors such
as the geographical location of the country in question, the level
of economic development, the country's willingness to cooperate,
and geopolitical considerations play more important roles than
do formal requirements of the GSP regulations.
As far as the effectiveness of removal from the GSP regime
is concerned, the mere threat of sanctions may be effective in
regulating countries that disrespect core labor standards due to
economic pressures. But sanctions are less effective when labor
rights are disrespected due to political pressures. Therefore,
this Article predicts that the situations in Myanmar and
Belarus will not change as a result of sanctions, especially since
both countries have important political and economic sponsors
such as China and Russia. However, the implementation of
sanctions as such shows that the European Union pays serious
attention to violations of core labor standards, which may deter
other countries from following labor policies that would result in
sanctions.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II deals with the
reasons why countries might not be willing to promote core
labor standards. It pays special attention to economic and
political justifications and highlights the practical significance
of distinguishing between them. Part III discusses the revised
procedure under the European law for withdrawing countries
from preferential trade treatment for violations of core labor
standards. Part IV presents three cases in which the procedure
for withdrawal has been triggered or was close to being
triggered. Part V provides an analysis of the effectiveness of
sanctions and makes policy recommendations based on the case
studies. Part VI concludes.
II. ATTITUDES TOWARD CORE LABOR STANDARDS
A. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF CORE LABOR STANDARDS
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Declaration on
6. See, e.g., BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 105 (2005).
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Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work "[d]eclares that all
Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of
membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to
realize . . . the principles concerning the fundamental rights[.]"7
These fundamental or "core" labor standards are:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of
the right to collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor;
(c) the effective abolition of child labor; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation.8
There are many reasons to support core labor standards.
The economic reason suggests that the standards help prevent
unfair competition, for instance by prohibiting forced labor or
child labor. The goods produced under unfair conditions can be
cheaper and more competitive than goods produced under "good"
conditions.' Although critics of this argument suggest that
richer countries with higher productivity easily outperform
developing countries with unfair standards,'" inferior labor
standards can distort competition between countries with
similar levels of economic development.
Another reason to promote core labor standards is to avoid
a race to the bottom." The Preamble to the Constitution of the
ILO reflects the race-to-the-bottom concern by mentioning that
the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is
an obstacle for other nations desiring to improve conditions in
their own countries.'2 If countries compete by using low labor
standards to attract foreign direct investment, the world could
end up with no standards at all, and this would not be the most
socially desirable result as argued below.
A legal argument in support of core labor standards is that
these are fundamental rights guaranteed by important
7. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, infra
note 13, § 2.
8. Id.
9. ARVIND PANAGARIYA, LABOR STANDARDS AND TRADE SANCTIONS: RIGHT
END WRONG MEANS 1 (2003), available at http://129.3.20.41/eps/it/papers/0309/
0309004.pdf.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Sarah H. Cleveland, Why International Labor Standards?, in
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE AND PUBLIC POLICY 129,
139-41 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003).
12. ILO CONST. pmbl.
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international legal instruments." The ILO considers core labor
standards as "a tool used both to assist development and to
measure progress toward development."'4  In its recently
published Core Labor Standards Handbook, the ILO mentions
that respect for core labor standards has a number of positive
governance effects; for example, it:
(i) builds respect for the law;
(ii) increases respect for human rights;
(iii) promotes decent work;
(iv) improves dialogue between social partners; and
(v) improves prospects for exports as importing countries
increasingly demand respect for ILS including CLS.'5
Another ILO study concludes that "collective bargaining
and tripartite dialogue are necessary elements creating an
environment that encourages high productivity, attracts foreign
direct investments and enables the society and the economy to
adjust to external factors such as financial crisis and natural
disasters."'6
Empirical research suggests that political and economic
freedoms, which include freedom of association and other
fundamental rights, are positively correlated with economic
growth. Other studies show "a mutually supportive
relationship between successfully sustained trade reforms and
improvements in association and bargaining rights."'8 Kimberly
Elliott and Richard Freeman show there is also consumer
13. For instance, freedom of association is guaranteed by numerous important
international legal instruments. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights
arts. 20, 23, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. DOC.
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights art. 8, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 50, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. DOC.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art. 22,
G.A. Res 2200A (XXI) at 55, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. DOC. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966); ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work § 2 (June
1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration (follow "Text of the Declaration").
14. ILO, CORE LABOR STANDARDS HANDBOOK 11 (2006).
15. Id.
16. ILO, Country Studies on the Social Impact of Globalization: Final Report,
94, GB.276/WP/SDL/1, 276th Sess. (Nov. 1999).
17. See Surjit Bhalla, Freedom and Economic Growth: A Virtuous Cycle?, in
DEMOCRACY'S VICTORY AND CRISIS: NOBEL SYMPOSIUM NO. 93, 195, 195 (Axel
Hadenius ed., 1997) ("[A] one point increase in political freedom (on a seven point
scale) leads to an increase in per-capita growth of approximately 1 percent.").
18. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND
LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 112 (1996).
2008]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 17:2
demand in society for decent labor standards. 9
Despite these good reasons to implement core labor
standards, some countries consciously and systematically
violate those standards. The next section will consider the
reasons that drive these violations.
B. ECONOMIC REASONS FOR DISRESPECT
The main economic reasons for a country's reluctance to
respect the core labor standards are fears that the standards
may weaken exports, ° raise the cost of labor and deter foreign
investment,2 and may halt entire industries by strikes or other
forms of collective action.2
Governments may experience direct pressure from
multinational enterprises aimed at blocking measures which
would give workers more rights. Multinationals often lobby for
lower labor standards because they fear that the introduction of
more restrictive labor regulations would decrease profits or
reduce control over their workforce.23 Moreover, influential
international organizations such as the World Bank recommend
that governments adopt flexible and employer-friendly labor
regulations to improve the business climate.24
Elliott and Freeman suggest distinguishing between the
19. See KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, INST. FOR INT'L ECON.,
CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 28-45 (2003).
20. See TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 18, at 85
("Unions are simply prohibited in the export-processing zones of Bangladesh and
Pakistan... while they are discouraged in Guatemala and Panama.").
21. The government of Bangladesh opposed allowing unions into national
export processing zones and argued that unions would deter investment and lower
exports. See Kimberly Ann Elliott & Richard B. Freeman, The Role Global Labor
Standards Could Play in Addressing Basic Needs, in GLOBAL INEQUALITIES AT
WORK 299, 320 (Jody Heymann ed., 2003).
22. For instance, trade unions in France often halt railroads or airlines,
causing serious economic damage to businesses and political troubles for the
government. See generally STEVE JEFFERYS, LIBERT9, EGALITt, AND FRATERNITt AT
WORK: CHANGING FRENCH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND MANAGEMENT (2003).
23. For instance, multinationals in China vigorously opposed changes in labor
legislation that would improve workers' rights. See GLOBAL LABOR STRATEGIES,
UNDUE INFLUENCE: CORPORATIONS GAIN GROUND IN BATTLE OVER CHINA'S NEW
LABOR LAW-BUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR ADVOCATES ARE PUSHING BACK 1
(2007), available at http://laborstrategies.blogs.com (follow article title under "GLS
Reports").
24. See The World Bank Group, Doing Business Project, Employing Workers,
Jan. 26, 2008, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/EmployingWorkers/
(ranking regions' and economies' employer-friendly indicators, which measure
employment laws of various countries).
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"core" labor standards promulgated by the ILO and "cash"
standards. 25 The latter mandate specific outcomes and thereby
directly increase labor costs, potentially affecting the level of
economic development. 6  They suggest that poor countries,
unlike rich countries, cannot afford higher cash standards such
as minimum wages, workplace safety, or shorter working
hours.27 However, all core labor standards are also to some
extent cash standards, because they require a certain level of
additional enforcement and always involve additional costs that
could affect economic performance. Both businesses and
governments fear that strengthening workers' rights will
increase the cost of labor and will make businesses and national
economies less competitive.
Although many governments are convinced that ignoring
core labor standards would help their economies grow, in reality
the connection is not so obvious. There is an ongoing debate
between economists over whether non-market intervention,
including support of freedom of association, can improve
economic performance. The liberal argument is that
intervention would create distortions in the market, which
would otherwise function perfectly and produce optimal
results.28  According to Srinivasan, unions and collective
bargaining will drive wages above "market" levels and reduce
employment.29 Van Beers suggests that strict labor standards
are associated with reduced exports of goods produced with
skilled labor."
On the other hand, some economists argue that market
failures such as imperfect information or asymmetry of
bargaining power can be tackled by trade unions. Unions have
collective voice effects, which can improve productivity and raise
wages. 1 They can improve workers' bargaining power, and help
25. See CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION?, supra note
19, at 13.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Will Martin & Keith E. Maskus, Core Labor Standards and
Competitiveness: Implications for Global Trade Policy, 9 REV. INT'L ECON. 317, 317
(2001).
29. T.N. Srinivasan, International Labor Standards Once Again!, in
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM, (Gregory K. Schoepfle & Kennth A. Swinnerton eds.,
U.S. Dep't of Labor 1994).
30. Cees van Beers, Labor Standards and Trade Flows of OECD Countries, 21
WORLD ECON. 57, 58-73 (1998).
31. See generally Richard Freeman, Labor Market Institutions and Policies:
20081
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workers overcome lack of information about such issues as
health hazards. Stiglitz argues that collective bargaining can
enhance the overall efficiency of the economy by improving the
system of distribution of wealth, which would not occur or would
be too costly to implement through the tax system.32 On the
other hand, he also realizes that collective labor relations can
"hold up" the rest of economy by making labor costs prohibitive
in some industries.
33
In 1996, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) conducted a study that found no evidence
that countries with low core labor standards enjoy a better
global export performance than countries with higher
standards. 34  The study suggests that the economic effect of
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining can
help upgrade the production process, while also raising workers'
motivation and productivity. 35  Freedom of association and
collective bargaining can produce positive effects such as
"counteract[ing] the market power of employers, while also
improving worker-management cooperation and information
sharing."36  However, the study warns that these rights can
introduce a new distortion in the market if unionized workers
succeed in raising their wages and working conditions above
optimal market levels.37
The OECD study suggests that fears that improved
compliance with core labor standards could jeopardize trade
reforms are unfounded.38 The study concludes "that the output
effects of greater freedom-of-association and collective
bargaining rights are likely to be negligible compared with other
factors such as shifts in technology, raw-material prices and
terms of trade. 39  However, comparisons of quantifiable
economic indicators and freedom of association cannot yield
perfect results. A more recent study examined the influence of
the industrial relations system on direct foreign investment in
Help or Hindrance to Economic Development?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 117 (World Bank 1992).
32. See generally Joseph Stiglitz, Democratic Development as the Fruits of
Labor, 4 PERSP. ON WORK 31 (2000).
33. Id.
34. See TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 18, at 12.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id. at 82.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id. at 112.
39. Id. at 12.
216 [Vol. 17:2
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OECD countries and concluded that multinationals from
developed nations prefer the countries "that provide
management with a greater amount of leeway in allocating
labor and reducing employee voice at work."4°
Although economic reasons are the most typical reasons for
disrespecting labor standards, sometimes these reasons play a
less important role than political reasons, as the next section
will discuss.
C. POLITICAL REASONS FOR DISRESPECT
Political reasons for violation of core labor standards come
into play when countries try to achieve certain political goals.
While freedom of association is the most obvious target of
political repressions, governments might also restrict other
fundamental rights for political purposes. For instance, they
may use forced labor to build military infrastructure or
discriminate against a particular group in society to reduce its
political influence.
The principle of freedom of association is a peculiar
fundamental principle and deserves special attention in the
political context. It is the only positively formulated principle in
the ILO list of negative core labor rights which includes
elimination of forced labor, child labor, and discrimination in
the workplace. Freedom of association comes first in the ILO
list, which emphasizes the importance of this principle. It is the
only enabling principle by means of which workers can reach
agreements with employers through collective bargaining. The
realization of freedom of association requires not only non-
interference of the state in trade union affairs, but also
affirmative protection of organized workers from employers who
might create obstacles for workers' organizations.
Another important aspect of freedom of association is that
its realization depends on respect of other civil liberties.
According to the ILO, freedom of opinion and expression,
freedom of assembly, freedom from arbitrary arrest and
detention, and the right to a fair trial by an independent and
impartial tribunal are among the liberties necessary for the
40. Hwikwon Ham & Morris M. Kleiner, Do Industrial Relations Institutions
Influence Foreign Direct Investment? Evidence from OECD Nations, 46 INDUs. REL.
305, 324 (2007).
41. See generally ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, supra note 13.
2008]
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realization of trade union rights.42 It is hardly possible to
imagine strong and independent trade unions in a non-
democratic state, where basic human rights such as freedom of
speech and freedom of assembly are not respected.
Freedom of association not only allows workers to organize
and negotiate but also increases their power in relation to
employers and to the state. Countries that lack labor law
enforcement mechanisms, including the least developed
countries, will certainly benefit from the increased power of
workers when exercised responsibly. The workers are in a
better position to understand what would help them to be more
productive and how to achieve optimal arrangements with their
employers. But authoritarian regimes might see the power of
labor as a threat to their political hegemony.
Not surprisingly, denial of core labor standards such as
freedom of association occurs much more often in non-
democratic political systems than in democracies. 3 As Freeman
points out, "[i]f the world consisted solely of democracies, the
argument against global labor standards would carry
substantially more weight."" It is not surprising that almost all
authoritarian regimes prevent freedom of association.45 Using
corporate law terminology, opposition to freedom of association
can be described as the blocking minority argument. The
premise of this argument is that although the establishment of
freedom of association will make the society better off, some
groups will be worse off. 7 In this scenario, the minority will
usually be represented by a ruling elite with concentrated
political power it uses to suppress trade unions. The elite
minority will use its power to "block" the majority's freedom of
association, despite the negative impact this has on society
overall. Trade unions are seen by non-democratic political
regimes as a danger to political stability and a source of
42. LO, Resolution Concerning Trade Union Rights and Their Relation to Civil
Liberties, International Labour Conference, 54th Sess., Geneva, 1970.
43. See generally Julio Valenzuela, Labor Movements and Political Systems, in
THE FUTURE OF LABOR MOVEMENTS (Marino Regini ed., 1992).
44. See Freeman, supra note 31, at 302.
45. See Press Release, Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2008: Global
Freedom in Retreat (Jan. 16, 2008), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?
page=70&release=612.
46. TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 18, at 35. For a
list of rights afforded to minority shareholders that can be used to dominate the
majority, see, generally, 12B Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
§5813 (rev. vol. 1987).
47. TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 18, at 35.
218 [Vol. 17:2
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potential popular revolt.
These fears of authoritarian governments are not
completely unfounded. The Polish Solidarity trade unions
greatly contributed to the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc.48 In
South Africa, unions played an important role in the struggle
against apartheid.4 9 More recently, unions in Zimbabwe have
been targeted by President Robert Mugabe because they are
seen as a part of the political opposition." China is another
country where the motivation for suppressing independent trade
unions is political and where "official" trade unions still function
as quasi-state entities.' Authoritarian governments may prefer
to establish trade unions themselves and to control them in
order to give the appearance of freedom of association without
suffering the possible political repercussions of actually granting
such freedom.
Strong authoritarian regimes resort to political repression
to prevent potential revolt. On the other side of the spectrum
are governments that do not have the capacity to enforce their
laws. The next section discusses lack of resources as a reason
for disrespecting core labor standards.
D. LACK OF RESOURCES AS A REASON FOR DISRESPECT
Violations of core labor rights may also occur in countries
that do not have control over their territories and where the rule
of law is nonexistent or very weak. The governments of these
countries may agree with the core labor standards, but simply
lack the financial resources or political capacity to enforce their
law. 2 Countries like Somalia or Iraq today can hardly be
blamed for labor rights violations, simply because their
governments cannot effectively implement these policies in
conditions of political turmoil or civil war.
It would make little sense to sanction countries under
foreign occupation or at war for disrespecting core labor
48. See Bartosz Kaliski, Solidarity, 1980-1: The Second Vistula Miracle? 134, in
REVOLUTION AND RESISTANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE: CHALLENGES TO COMMUNIST
RULE (Kevin McDermott & Matthew Stibbe eds., 2006).
49. Jeremy Seekings, Trade Unions, Social Policy & Class Compromise in Post-
Apartheid South Africa, 31 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 299, 299 (2004).
50. See Zimbabwe: Brutal Trade Union Arrests, 43 AFR. RES. BULL.: POL., SOC.
& CULTURAL SERIES 16802 (2006).
51. See generally Feng Chen, Between the State and Labour: The Conflict of
Chinese Trade Unions'Double Identity in Market Reform, 176 CHINA Q. 1006 (2003).
52. TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 18, at 152.
2008] 219
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standards, because these countries have little power to enforce
their laws. Governments in these countries are more likely to
spend their resources to stabilize their societies and strengthen
their political power and to see labor standards as secondary
and non-urgent. However, in some countries the real question
is whether the issue is truly a lack of resources, or simply
corruption or a choice to commit resources to other purposes
such as the military or public health.
Law enforcement and informal economic relations remain
important problems not only for poor economies but also for
transitional and rich.3 In some countries there is traditionally a
gap between law on the books and law in practice. Even the
best laws will be meaningless in the absence of actual
implementation. 4 Another problem is the informal economy,
where a large portion of workers work in the unregulated
shadow sector." The problem with the informal economy is that
the level of organization is much lower, making it very difficult
to monitor compliance with international labor standards. 6
It is difficult to agree that "the lack of resources fails to
explain violations of the core standards of freedom of association
and forced labor."57 Realization of freedom of association implies
not only that governments should refrain from intervention in
union affairs, but also an affirmative duty to protect unions vis-
et-vis employers by creating appropriate and enforceable legal
rules. It is quite possible to imagine situations when trade
unions are repressed by employers rather than by the
government and the latter is too weak to interfere to prevent the
violations. By the same token, private parties may use forced
labor despite governmental opposition. There is nothing in ILO
conventions making forced labor a violation which could be
carried out only by the state and not by private parties.
Therefore, the ILO conventions allow sanctions against a
government for failing to regulate private parties.
53. See ILO, Decent Work and the Informal Economy, International Labour
Conference, 90th Sess., Rep. VI, Geneva, 2002, available at http://www2.ilo.org/dyn/
dwresources/docs/375/F211229726/report6.pdf.
54. See Yaraslau Kryvoi, Discrimination and Security of Employment in a Post-
Soviet Context, 22 INT'L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 5, 7-8 (2006) (discussing
"legal nihilism" in post-Soviet countries).
55. See generally FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER, SIZE AND MEASUREMENT OF INFORMAL
ECONOMY IN 110 COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD (2002), available at
http://rru.worldbank.org/DocumentsPapersLinks/InformalEconomy.pdf.
56. See Decent Work and the Informal Economy, supra note 53, at 71-74.
57. STEVE CHARNOVITZ, TRADE LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 244 (2002).
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E. PRACTICAL MEANING OF VARIOUS REASONS FOR DISRESPECT
The main hypothesis from this review is that it should be
easier to influence those countries that disrespect core labor
standards on economic grounds than those that do it for political
reasons. The governments motivated by economic
considerations care more about money and the overall social
impact of their policies. Cost-benefit analysis would suggest
that as a result of trade sanctions, such governments would lose
more money than they would win by attracting foreign investors
with low labor standards. Hence, they would tend to comply
with the international obligations under ILO conventions.
However, if the benefits from violating core labor standards are
greater than benefits of compliance, they might prefer not to
comply.
If the government suppresses unions or violates other labor
rights on political grounds, the cost of losing political control by
allowing organized political dissent may be too great. This is
especially true if the ruling elite could face criminal charges or
other serious sanctions as a result of regime change. Therefore,
if the motivation is not money but rather retention of political
control, sanctions are likely to be ineffective unless they lead to
dramatic changes in national economies, as occurred in South
Africa. 8
An important implication of differences between economic
and political motivations to suppress trade union rights relates
to a country's international reputation. A poor international
reputation may lead to less foreign direct investment. Therefore
democratic regimes are more sensitive to reputation costs and
may prefer to comply with international standards. Non-
democratic or dictatorial regimes care less about their
reputation in the international arena because their reputation is
already bad. The "mobilization of shame," as Sarah Cleveland
put it, can play an effective role for regulating relatively
democratic countries that do not follow international standards
on economic grounds. 9
For countries that do not respect core labor standards
because of their lack of resources, applying sanctions will not
make sense if the governments are incapable of enforcing their
58. Such dramatic changes are difficult to anticipate when countries have
supportive "bigger brothers." This phenomenon is evident with both Myanmar
(supported by China), and Belarus (supported by Russia), as will be shown below.
59. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2001).
2008]
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laws. However, if the government is strong enough to enforce
laws but knowingly allows violations of core labor standards
claiming the absence of resources, political and economic
sanctions might have a positive effect.
The next section of this Article deals with linking labor
rights and trade sanctions by means of the Generalized System
of Preferences established by the European Union, which will be
followed by the application of the hypothesis outlined above.
III. EUROPEAN UNION'S GSP AND LABOR STANDARDS
A. LINKING TRADE AND LABOR STANDARDS
There are various ways to promote labor standards, which
include "soft" methods such as labeling initiatives, shareholder
activism, public campaigns, and codes of conduct.6" Soft
methods are applied by consumer groups and corporations,
rather than by governments, and they target consumers' and
shareholders' sense of social responsibility for their purchasing
decisions. But soft methods may be costly or difficult to initiate.
In the absence of transparency and universal disclosure rules,
the supply of information about working conditions is costly to
obtain and often unavailable at the point of purchase. These
initiatives can have quasi-legal effects on national legal
systems, though one should not overestimate their impact.
Enforcement of labor standards ultimately lies with national
governments and courts that decide cases primarily on the basis
of domestic law.61
Trade is often seen as an effective tool to foster economic
development.62 The benefits of international trade are obvious
from an economic perspective-trade helps increase export
earnings, increases diversification of national economies, and
promotes foreign investment. Some scholars see trade as one
way to foster the development and growth of transitional
countries by providing special tariffs, which make goods from
60. See generally Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor
Standards, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 261 (2004) (discussing the importance of soft
law mechanisms).
61. See Kryvoi, supra note 1, at 381 (discussing the limitations of international
labor law and litigating international labor rights in national courts).
62. See generally L. Alan Winters, International Trade and Poverty: Cause or
Cure?, 39 AUSTL. ECON. REV. 347 (2006).
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economically weaker countries more competitive.63 Others are
not so optimistic about trade as an economic equalizer and
argue that it increases inequality.'
Some methods to promote core labor standards can be very
costly. For instance, the 1995 World Development Report,
which addressed the issue of child labor, called for programs
that increase income security, reduce costs of education, and
improve the quality of schooling.65 Panagariya refers to a study
done by Consumer Utility and Trust Company, an NGO based
in India, showing that it would cost anywhere between $12
billion to $18 billion per annum in India alone to send all
existing child workers to school.' It is unlikely that developed
countries would be willing or able to significantly contribute to
this cost.
Unilateral sanctions such as withdrawing trade preferences
because of labor rights violations can be considered a cheap way
to promote compliance with international obligations in the
sense that sanctions do not require direct financial spending.67
Unlike multilateral sanctions, these sanctions can be
implemented relatively quickly as there is no need to achieve
international consensus.68 There is usually an aspiration that
other countries would join, and that the unilateral character of
sanctions might change to multilateral.
Successful examples of the use of trade to enforce labor
standards include the U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade
Agreement.69 The United States offered an increase in the
textile quota by fourteen percent if working conditions in the
Cambodia textile and apparel sector substantially complied with
63. See generally Bernard Hoekman, Constantine Michalopoulos & L. Alan
Winters, Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the WTO:
Moving Forward After Cancan, 27 WORLD ECON. 481 (2004).
64. See generally Ajit Ghose, Global Inequality and International Trade, 28
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 229 (2004).
65. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: WORKERS IN AN
INTEGRATED WORLD 72-73 (1995).
66. See PANAGARIYA, supra note 9, at 6.
67. However, the international economic competitiveness of the country
imposing sanctions can be hurt by reduction of trade with the target country.
68. The European Union, upon which this paper is primarily focused, is an
exception here because many of its decisions should be agreed upon by consensus of
various states.
69. Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-made Fiber, Non-
Cotton Vegetable Fiber and Silk Blend Textiles and Textile Products Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Royal Government of
Cambodia, U.S.-Cambodia, art. 10, Jan. 20, 1999.
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local law and internationally recognized core standards." The
combined efforts of the United States and the ILO have led to
substantial improvement of labor standards in Cambodia.7'
One of the most promising avenues for addressing gross
violations of labor standards is to link enforcement of these
rights with trade preferences. The linkage between trade and
labor is already more than half a century old." Preferential
treatment was initially considered as discrimination disallowed
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The
Preamble of GATT mentions the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce and Article XIII
articulates the basic GATT principle that like goods should be
treated alike without discrimination.
In 1964, the first Secretary-General of United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) proposed the
idea of granting developing countries preferential tariff rates for
industrialized markets.74  The second UNCTAD conference
formally adopted the "generalized system of preferences."75 In
1971, GATT contracting parties allowed preference-giving
countries to gain preferential tariff treatment under national
GSP schemes.76  Initially such preferential treatment was
allowed for a ten-year period and in 1979 it was extended for an
indefinite period.
According to Resolution 21(ii) adopted at the UNCTAD II
Conference in New Delhi in 1968,
[TIhe objectives of the generalized, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory
system of preferences in favor of the developing countries, including
special measures in favor of the least advanced among the developing
countries, should be:
(a) to increase their export earnings;
(b) to promote their industrialization; and
70. See Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working to Improve
Conditions in Cambodia's Garment Factories, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 79, 90
(2004).
71. See Kolben, supra note 2, at 255.
72. Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labor Standards on the
World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L LABOUR REV. 565, 565
(1987).
73. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
74. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, About GSP,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=l (last visited
Feb. 3, 2008).
75. Resolution 21(ii) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (1964).
76. About GSP, supra note 74.
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(c) to accelerate their rates of economic growth.
As of 2008 there were thirteen national GSP schemes
reported to the UNCTAD secretariat, but most of them do not
link trade to labor rights.7
The first GSP scheme was implemented by the European
Community in 1971 through regulations for industrialised
products, textile products, agricultural products, and those
covered by the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty."
The GSP is a twofold measure-on the one hand, it provides
additional trade preferences to developing and transition
countries, and on the other hand, the governments can
withdraw these preferences in certain cases.
Not everybody supports linking GSP to labor rights. It is
argued that such a link is "a controversial market-based
approach that seeks to relocate globalized labour law into the
field of international trade law."79 Indeed, the very goal of trade
agreements is to liberalize trade; attaching labor strings to
these agreements is not always consistent with free trade. In
2004, the WTO Appellate Body put into question the
compatibility of linking human rights to trade preferences,
declaring that any preferences granted must be based on
objective and transparent criteria for the selection of the
beneficiary countries, i.e. countries in similar conditions should
be treated similarly for the purposes of GSP ° Although the
decision did not deal specifically with labor arrangements, these
special arrangement initiatives became a matter of some
uncertainty under GATT." If sanctions in the labor rights
context are not applied equally to countries with similar labor
rights compliance because of geopolitical or economic reasons,
these sanctions can well be considered as "unjustified
discrimination" within the meaning of the GATT. 2 Such
77. Id.
78. EUROPEAN COMM'N, DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR TRADE, THE EUROPEAN
UNION'S GENERALISED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 3, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eudoclib/docs/2004/marcltradoc_116448.pdf (last visited on
Mar. 27, 2008).
79. See HEPPLE, supra note 6, at 89.
80. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 139, WT/DS246/AB/R
(Apr. 7, 2004).
81. Anne Davies, Should the European Union Have the Power to Set Minimum
Standards for Collective Labour Rights in the Member States?, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS
HUMAN RIGHTS 177, 189 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
82. Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of
Workers'Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 145 (1999).
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sanctions can potentially be challenged in the framework of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
The United States and the European Union are the only
legal systems that have incorporated clauses dealing with social
rights into their GSP and use withdrawal procedures against
those who do not comply. A number of studies have already
compared the European Union and the United States GSP
regimes. The United States has resorted to withdrawal
procedures on a number of occasions, and its application of GSP
has been labeled as "aggressive unilateralism," 3 criticized for
being based on geopolitical and foreign policy concerns.'
Compared to the United States GSP, the European Union's
system directly refers to the eight core ILO conventions and
therefore allegedly does not undermine the rule of international
law. 5 The procedure in the European Union is considered more
transparent, 6 and some authors claim that there is "no evidence
of preferences being granted or denied by the European Union
for protectionist or political purposes."87 The European Union
started resorting to unilateral measures to address violations of
labor rights only recently, and the rest of this Part describes the
nature and the mechanism of implementation of the European
Union's GSP.
B. THE GSP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union plays an important role in
international trade, and especially in trade with developing
countries. The European Union absorbs twenty percent of
developing country exports and forty percent of its imports
originate in developing countries.8 The European Union is also
the world's largest importer of agricultural products from
developing countries, absorbing more than the United States,
83. See Compa & Vogt, supra note 3, at 235.
84. Id.
85. HEPPLE, supra note 6, at 105; George Tsogas, Labour Standards in the
Generalized Systems of Preferences of the European Union and the United States, 6
EUR. J. INDUS. REL. 349, 363-65 (2000).
86. HEPPLE, supra note 6, at 105.
87. Id. The absence of political purposes will be put in question at the end of
this Article.
88. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Developing Countries: Commission Unveils
System of Trade Preferences for Next Ten Years-Simple, Transparent, and
Objective (July 7, 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/pr070704_en.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
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Canada, and Japan combined."
Increasing economic cooperation by means of liberalized
trade was the main reason for integration in Europe, which led
to significant economic growth? There are two central
elements of this integration: (1) the prohibition of customs
duties and of quantities restrictions between Member States on
the import and export of goods, and measures having equivalent
effect; and (2) the establishment of a common customs tariff and
a common commercial policy toward third-party countries.'
This means that goods from third-party countries receive
identical treatment in all Member States. Once the goods enter
the European Union, they freely circulate among Member
States without customs charges or other discriminatory
treatment.
Accordingly, the European Community bodies, and not the
Member States, develop and implement the GSP regime.
Article 113, which is the core of European Common Commercial
Policy, establishes that the common commercial policy should be
based on uniform principles with regard to tariff rates, the
conclusion of trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity
in liberalization, in export policy, and in protective trade
measures. 92  According to paragraph 3 of Article 113, the
European Commission submits proposals to the European
Union Council for implementing the common commercial policy,
which acts by a qualified majority. One of the criticisms of the
European Union's GSP system is that a small group of countries
can block any action, because decisions are made by a qualified
majority.93
Unlike the Unites States GSP, which provides only for
sanctions, the European Union also provides an another way to
promote labor standards by giving additional trade preferences
for "good" conduct. Although the effect of GSP arrangements is
not always obvious,94 they are generally considered beneficial for
89. Id.
90. See generally Harald Badinger, Growth Effects of Economic Integration:
Evidence from the EU Member States, 141 REV. WORLD ECON. 1610 (2005).
91. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 3, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C325) 40.
92. Id. art. 113.
93. Tsogas supra note 85, at 365.
94. See Arvind Panagariya, European Union Preferential Trade Arrangements
and Developing Countries, 25 WORLD ECON. 1415, 1425 (2002) (arguing that a
definite positive impact of trade preferences on developing countries is difficult to
detect, because the special schemes offered to other developed countries can be more
beneficial, resulting in de facto discrimination of developing countries).
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developing and transitional countries, because exports from
these countries become more competitive.
The European Union Council Regulation for a ten-year
period from 2006 to 2015 establishes the current regime of the
GSP.95 According to Article 1 of the Regulation, there are three
types of arrangements for beneficiary countries.96 First, under
the default regime, all beneficiary countries enjoy the benefit of
the general arrangement (about 170 countries in total). Second,
there is a "special incentive arrangement" for sustainable
development and good governance, which provides for additional
benefits for countries implementing certain international
standards in human and labor rights, environmental protection,
combating illegal drug trafficking, and good governance.97 The
special incentive arrangement also provides for suspension of
specific duties on certain products originating from the so-called
"vulnerable countries."9  In 2005, the European Commission
adopted a list of fifteen countries that can benefit from such
arrangements.' Finally, there is a special arrangement for the
least-developed countries, also known as the "Everything but
Arms" initiative, which provides for the most favorable
treatment of all, with the aim of granting the least-developed
countries "duty-free and quota-free" access to the European
Union market."°
The European GSP regime also provides for a procedure of
withdrawing preferential treatment from countries that
seriously and systematically violate the principles of
conventions listed in the annex to Council regulation
95. Council Regulation 980/2005, Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff
Preferences, pmbl., 2005 O.J. (L 169) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU's GSP].
96. Prior to that there were six GSP schemes under European Union law: (a)
the general scheme; (b) the special scheme for the protection of labour rights; (c) the
special scheme for the protection of the environment; (d) the special scheme to
combat drug production and trafficking; (e) the special scheme for the least
developed countries; and (f) "Everything but Arms," for the world's 50 poorest
countries. See Council Regulation 2501/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 346) 1 (EC).
97. See Commission Decision 2005/924, 2005 O.J. (L 337) 50 (EC) for the list of
GSP+ beneficiary countries.
98. According to Article 9, Section 3 of the EU's GSP, a vulnerable country is
one that is not classified by the World Bank as a high income country during three
consecutive years and whose five largest sections of its GDP-covered imports to the
Community represent more than 75% in the value of its total GSP-covered imports,
which represent less than one percent in value of total GSP-covered impost to the
European Community. EU's GSP, supra note 95.
99. Commission Decision 2005/924, supra note 97.
100. See EU's GSP, supra note 95, § 3.
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establishing the regime of trade preferences. ' The list of
conventions includes all eight ILO fundamental conventions.'
The procedure for withdrawal consists of four stages:
consultations between Member States and the Commission, 103
initiating and conducting an investigation,'" monitoring the
situation for six months,' 5 and, finally, the Commission makes
its decision on temporary withdrawal. This withdrawal
permanently enters into force six months after it was begun,
unless the reasons justifying the withdrawal no longer prevail.'
The next section of the Article deals with cases of Myanmar,
Belarus, and Pakistan, when the European Union has triggered
or has nearly triggered withdrawal of violators from the GSP.
IV. CASE STUDIES ON THE USE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION'S GSP
A. MYANMAR
Myanmar, also known as Burma, is a country of about fifty-
five million people located in Southeast Asia. A military coup in
1962 was a starting point for gross human rights violations in
Myanmar that continue today.' 7 After tens of thousands of
101. See id. art. 16.
102. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29) (1930),
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C029; Convention Concerning Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (No. 87) (1948),
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C087; Convention Concerning the
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively
(No. 98) (1949), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C098; Convention
Concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal
Value (No. 100) (1951), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?COO; Convention
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105) (1957),
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C105; Convention Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No. 111) (1958),
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?Clll; Convention Concerning Minimum
Age for Admission to Employment (No 138) (1973), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C138; Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No 182) (1999),
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?Cl82. The websites for all eight
conventions were last visited on Feb. 4, 2008.
103. See EU's GSP, supra note 95, art. 18.
104. Id. arts. 19-20.
105. Id. art. 20.
106. Id.
107. John Badgley, Myanmar in 1993." A Watershed Year, 34 ASIAN SURV. 153,
153 (1994).
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Burmese rallied for democracy in 1988, the military junta
formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
to strengthen its political power."' The human rights situation
in Burma continued to deteriorate following the bloody end in
September 1988 of Myanmar's pro-democracy demonstrations,
when troops massacred at least 3,000 students and other largely
unarmed civilians on the streets of the capital and other cities."°
The SLORC generals consolidated their rule with forced labor,
rape, torture, forced relocation, and intimidation."0
However, until the late 1990s, large areas of southern and
eastern Myanmar remained relatively free of military rule due
to the resistance of numerous indigenous ethnic groups such as
the Mon, Karen, and Karenni."' But with a massive infusion of
new capital, largely from selling natural-gas concessions
offshore, the junta initiated an ethnic cleansing operation in an
attempt to consolidate its rule in rural areas of Myanmar."2
The junta extensively used violence against the indigenous
people when it sought to raise foreign exchange by harvesting
the world's last sizable stands of teak." 3
Following these events, the European Union imposed an
arms embargo and suspended defense cooperation with
Myanmar in 1990."' The subsequently-introduced visa ban and
asset freeze was directed against Myanmar senior military
officers, members of government, and their families."5
European Union registered companies were prohibited from
making financing available to named state-owned enterprises."6
In 1995, the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation filed a
joint complaint to the European Commission calling for
108. Id.
109. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BURMA (MYANMAR),http://www.hrw.org/reports/
1989/WR89/Burma.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
110. RAINFOREST RELIEF, TEAK IS TORTURE AND BURMA'S REIGN OF TERROR:
MON, KAREN, AND KARENNI INDIGENOUS PEOPLES THREATENED IN BURMA (1997),
http://nativenet.uthscsa.edu/archive/n9703/O119.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
111. See generally Bruce Johansen, Burma (Myanmar): Forced Labor in the
World's Last Teak Forest, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, (2003), available at http://www.ratical.org/ratville/IPEIE/Burma.
pdf.
112. Id.
113. See RAINFOREST RELIEF, supra note 105.
114. See EUR. COMM'N, THE EU'S RELATIONS WITH BURMAIMYANMAR,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external relations/myanmar/intro/index.htm.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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withdrawal of Myanmar from the European Union GSP because
of its use of forced labor."1 7 The submission to the European
Commission quoted the ILO regarding the violations occurring
in Myanmar:
[W]omen and children as well as men are randomly rounded up by
local police or the military from such public places as train stations
and movie theaters or from their homes or places of work; in many
cases, village headmen are responsible for filling porter quotas or
providing large sums of money to the military instead. [Porters] are
not paid for their work and are allowed very little food, water or rest.
In many case, porters are bound together in groups of 50-200 at night.
They are denied medical care. Porters are subject to hostile fire as
well as to abuse by the soldiers they serve. They are routinely beaten
by the soldiers and many of the women are raped repeatedly.
Unarmed themselves, they are placed at the head of the columns to
detonate mines and booby traps as well as to spring ambushes.
According to credible sources, many of these porters die as a result of
mistreatment, lack of adequate food and water, and use as human
mine sweepers[.]1
8
ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory
Labor defines "forced or compulsory labour" as all work or
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of
any penalty and for which the said person has not offered
himself voluntarily."19  Obviously, Myanmar breached its
obligations under ILO Convention No. 29.
In January 1996, the European Commission launched an
investigation of the alleged forced labor widely used by the
military regime of Myanmar.'2 ° Myanmar authorities claimed
that their practices fell under the exception provided by Article
2(b) of the ILO Convention Concerning Forced Labor, 2' which
excludes from the notion of forced labor "any work or service
which forms part of the normal civic obligations of the citizens of
a fully self-governing country."'22 Myanmar authorities did not
117. Id. at 1.
118. International Labour Organization, Report of the Committee Set up to
Consider the Representation Made by the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions Under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution Alleging Non-observance by
Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). Session 261, ILO Doc.
GB.261/13/7/, § 12 (Nov. 1994).
119. TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 18, at 152.
120. 19960.J. (C15) 3.
121. INT'L LABOUR ORG., CONVENTION CONCERNING FORCED OR COMPULSORY
LABOUR (1930), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm (follow
"C29 Forced Labour Convention" link).
122. Report of the ILO Director-General to the Members of the Governing Body
on Measures Taken by the Government of Myanmar Following the
Recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry Established to Examine its
2008)
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implement ILO recommendations and refused to allow the ILO
fact-finding team into the country.'23
In 1997, Myanmar became the first country from which the
European Union withdrew trade preferences for the widespread
use of forced labor.' 24  The Resolution withdrawing the
preferences specifically references the ILO in its preamble,
noting that the ILO recognized Myanmar's practices as forced
labor and has called for immediate repeal of the Myanmar laws
in question in order to ensure compliance with the letter and the
spirit of Convention No 29.125 As of 2008, Myanmar still lacks
trade preferences under the European Union GSP.
B. BELARUS
Belarus is a former Soviet Union republic located in the
north of Eastern Europe with a population of about ten million
people. It shares common borders with three European Union
countries. 26  Since 1996, the political situation in Belarus has
been deteriorating under the rule of authoritarian President
Alyaksandr Lukashenka. His administration restricted basic
human rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of
demonstrations, systematically rigged elections, and repressed
political opposition. 27 The United Nations appointed a Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus.' 2' The
most serious allegation against the regime is the disappearance
of three leading opposition leaders and a journalist in the
1990s.1 29
Observance of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), 24 (1999).
123. Council Regulation 552/97, Temporary Withdrawing Access to Generalized
Tariff Preferences from the Union of Myanmar. Official Journal L 85, 27.3.1997, at
8-9.
124. Id.
125. The United States has also introduced sanctions against Burma, noting
that the human and labor rights violations in Burma are of an egregious nature. The
sanctions recognized crimes including not only forced labor, but also rape as a
weapon of intimidation, forcible conscription of child soldiers, and ethnic cleansings
against minorities within Burma. See Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, H.R.
2330, 108th Cong. (2003).
126. These countries are Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.
127. See HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2007 360-64 (2007), available
at http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/O1/11/belarul4847.htm.
128. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Belarus was established by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
resolution 2004/14 and extended by resolution 2005/13.
129. Adrian Severin, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation with
Human Rights in Belarus, United Nations General Assembly, A/HRC/4/16, Jan. 15,
2007, at 7.
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In view of these events, in 2006 the European Council
decided to adopt restrictive measures against President
Lukashenka, the Belarusian leadership and officials personally
responsible for the violations of international electoral
standards, as well as for the crackdown on civil society and
democratic opposition. The European Union adopted a list that
includes individuals subject to travel bans to the European
Union. 3°
Another important concern of the European Union and
broader international community was freedom of association in
Belarus. European and international trade unions requested an
investigation into the violation of freedom of association in
Belarus 31 The request in particular mentioned the following
violations:
The authorities of Belarus have always opposed the existence of
independent organisations representing workers' rights and interests.
For many years, obstacles have been raised systematically to oppose
legal registration of free trade unions, to limit trade union activities,
and to repress trade union leaders and activists .... The government
[of Belarus] and the other public authorities have organised what can
only be called a systematic campaign against the main trade union
organisation, the FTUB, culminating in July 2002 in the taking over of
this organisation by one of the President's closest advisers.1
32
On December 23, 2003, the European Commission decided
to initiate an investigation into alleged violations of trade union
rights in Belarus' 33 According to the formal notice issued by the
Commission, the main problem in Belarus was violations of
freedom of association guaranteed by the ILO Conventions Nos.
87 and 98.' M  A number of international trade union
organizations initiated a complaint with regard to unions' rights
130. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, 2723rd Council Meeting,
Luxembourg, Apr. 10-11 2006, at 2, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu
ueDocs/cmsDatadocs/pressData/engena89219.pdf.
131. Letter from Guy Ryder, General Secretary, ICFTU, Emilio Gabaglio,
General Secretary, ETUC, & Willy Thys, WCL to Pascal Lamy, European Trade
Commissioner (Jan. 27, 2003), available at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.
asp?lndex=991217051.
132. Id.
133. Commission Decision 2004/23/EC, Providing for the Initiation of an
Investigation Pursuant to Article 27(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001
with Respect to the Violation of Freedom of Association in Belarus, 2004 O.J. (L 5)
90.
134. Commission, Notice of Initiation of an Investigation of Violation of Freedom
of Association in Belarus in View of Temporary Withdrawal of Benefits Under the
Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences (GSP), 2004 O.J. (C 40) 4.
2008]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
violations in Belarus. ' The complaint mentioned the following
violations of freedom of association: creating obstacles in
registration of trade unions, interference in trade union affairs,
and intimidation of trade union leaders, as well as delays of
transfer of union duties, unlawful entry into union premises,
and confiscation and destruction of union property and papers.
In 2004 both the ILO and the European Union sent
commissions to Belarus to investigate the violation of trade
union rights. The ILO Governing Body appointed a Commission
of Inquiry in accordance with its Constitution to investigate
trade union freedom in Belarus' 36 This is the strongest measure
the ILO can take against a Member State, to which it resorts
only in exceptionally grave cases. The Commission of Inquiry
was finalized its work in a report of July 2004, which criticized
the policies of the Belarusian authorities."7
According to the ILO Convention concerning Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, workers
and employers, without distinction, shall have the right to
establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization
concerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without
previous authorization.3 ' Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of this
Convention requires public authorities to refrain from any
interference in trade union affairs which would restrict this
right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. Belarusian
authorities breached these principles by creating obstacles to
135. Groups supplying the information were International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions, European Trade Union Confederation, and World Confederation of
Labor. Id. 1 1.
136. Int'l Labour Office, Officers of the Governing Body, Report of the Officers of
the Governing Body: Complaint Concerning the Non-observance by Belarus of the
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948
(No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.
98), Made by Delegates to the 91st Session (2003) of the International Labour
Conference Under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, para. 10, GB.288/8, 288th
Session (Oct. 14, 2003).
137. Int'l Labour Office, Trade Union Rights in Belarus: Report of the
Commission of Inquiry Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organization to Examine the Observance by the Government of
the Republic of Belarus of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), 163-75 (July 2004) [hereinafter Trade Union
Rights in Belarus], available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/
docs/gb291/pdflci-belarus.pdf.
138. ILO, Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize (No. 87) art. 2, Jul. 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, available at
http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/actrav-english/telearn.global/ilollaw/con87,htm.
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registration of trade union organizations, interfering in union
affairs, and discriminating against members of independent
trade unions. '39
Following the announcement of the start of the six-month
period of monitoring and evaluation, the European Union
Council adopted a resolution temporarily withdrawing Belarus
from access to the generalized tariff preferences.'" The
resolution mentions the ILO Commission of Inquiry report of
July 2004, which contained twelve recommendations of specific
steps to improve the situation in Belarus.'4' It also notes the
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) follow-up report in
March 2006 "in which the CFA pointed to the actual worsening
of the situation of trade unions' rights in Belarus."'42  The
European Union resolution also mentioned the June 2006 report
of the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards of the
International Labour Conference, which "deplored the continued
failure by the Belarusian Government to implement the
recommendations and stressed the necessity of rapid actions so
that real and tangible progress could be noted."'43  As the
situation with trade union rights in Belarus did not change, the
resolution withdrawing the preferences entered into force in
June 2007.'"
The main reason why Belarusian authorities limit freedom
of association is that they are trying to prevent potential revolt
or "color" revolution.'45 The unions are not their only target:
NGOs and political parties also have hard times in Belarus.'"
The memories of the Solidarity trade union movement in
Poland, which greatly contributed to the collapse of the
Communist Bloc, are too fresh to be ignored by the Belarusian
139. For more about trade unions in Belarus, see Yaraslau Kryvoi, The
Relationship Between the State and Trade Unions on the Labour Market: The
Belarusian Case, 48 BULL. OF COMP. LABOUR REL. 175 (2003).
140. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1933/2006, Temporary Withdrawing Access to
the Generalised Tariff Preferences from the Republic of Belarus, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L
405) 35, 39.
141. Trade Union Rights in Belarus, supra note 137, at 175-78.
142. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1933/2006, supra note 140, § 8.
143. Id. § 9.
144. Id. § 12.
145. The Belarusian authorities strengthened their grip after the Orange
Revolution in the neighboring Ukraine and the Revolution of Roses in Georgia. See
generally Vitali Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus, 16 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 83 (Oct. 2005).
146. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BELARUS: COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2007/100549.htm.
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authorities. This is the main reason why they do not comply
with the requests of the International Labor Organization and
the European Union to respect freedom of association.
C. PAKISTAN
Pakistan is an Asian country with a population of nearly
170 million people and shares common borders with Iran,
Afghanistan, India, and China. In 1999, General Pervez
Musharraf seized power in Pakistan as a result of a military
coup, declared himself president, and has remained in power
since that time. Ongoing human rights violations in Pakistan
include "arbitrary detention; lack of due process; the
mistreatment, torture, and 'disappearance' of terrorism suspects
and political opponents; harassment and intimidation of the
media; and legal discrimination against and mistreatment of
women and religious minorities."'47
Labor rights violations are a part of a bigger picture of
human rights violations in Pakistan, as a study of Human
Rights Watch shows:
Millions of workers in Pakistan are held in contemporary forms of
slavery. Throughout the country employers forcibly extract labor from
adults and children, restrict their freedom of movement, and deny
them the right to negotiate the terms of their employment. Employers
coerce such workers into servitude through physical abuse, forced
confinement, and debt-bondage. The state offers these workers no
effective protection from this exploitation. Although slavery is
unconstitutional in Pakistan and violates various national and
international laws, state practices support its existence.
1 48
Pakistan ratified the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms
of Child Labor and undertook an obligation to implement urgent
measures to prohibit and eliminate the worst forms of child
labor, which include debt-bondage and serfdom.1 49
In 1995, a number of international and European trade
unions"5 ° submitted a petition to the European Commission with
147. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND: OVERVIEW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUES IN PAKISTAN (2007), http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/0l/1/
pakistl4756.htm.
148. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF SLAVERY IN PAKISTAN 1
(1995), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/c/crd/pakistan957.pdf.
149. ILO, Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No. 182) arts. 1-3, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm (follow "C 182" hyperlink).
150. The trade unions were the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions; the European Trade Union Congress; the International Textile, Garment
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regard to forced labor in Pakistan. According to the submission:
An uncertain number of people, certainly at least several millions, are
enslaved in different forms of forced or bonded labour in Pakistan.
Millions are children. Typical working conditions involve incredibly
long hours of work, seven days a week, 52 weeks a year; serious
neglect of basic occupational health and safety standards; steadily
accumulating debt; and a predominantly child work force in work
places in many sectors including shoes, brick kilns, footballs and
surgical instruments.'
5
'
The petition urged the European Commission to initiate an
investigation in accordance with European Union Regulation on
the GSP.'52  Although the situation in Pakistan has not
improved, the European Commission neither initiated an
investigation nor called for stronger measures. The government
of Pakistan used various tactics to derail any investigation, but
apparently the European Union member states were themselves
not willing to launch an investigation.'53
Quite on the contrary, in 2005 the European Union included
Pakistan in the list of countries that benefit from special
incentives for the protection of labor rights and environment
and for combating drug production and trafficking.'54 The
European Commission decided to actively support projects in
Pakistan under the ILO's international program for the
eradication of child labor and in collaboration with the ILO and
UNICEF.'55 In 2002 the European Commission explained that
the decision to grant the additional preferences to Pakistan was
linked to wider political motives and, in particular, the "fight
against terror," the change of Pakistan's position in relation to
Taliban regime and its determination to return to democratic
rule.'56 Most recently, the European Commission proposed to
give Pakistan 200 million Euros in economic aid.'5'
and Leather Workers Federation; and the European Trade Union Committee:
Textiles, Clothing and Leather. INT'L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS,
ENDING THE MENACE OF BONDED LABOR IN PAKISTAN: SUBMISSION UNDER THE
GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1998),
http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=990916192&Language=EN.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Tsogas, supra note 85, at 122.
154. Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005, supra note 95 T 7.
155. See generally Barbara Brandtner & Allan Rosas, Trade Preferences and
Human Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 699 (P. Alston ed., 1999).
156. European Commission, European Union Response to 11 September-Latest
Update on European Commission Action, Briefing on 12 March, 2002.
157. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, EU-Pakistan: Commission Proposes Increase
in Assistance (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
2008]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
D. ANALYSIS OF CASES
The most obvious similarity between the situations in
Myanmar, Belarus, and Pakistan is the existence of well-
documented violations of the core labor standards. Forced labor
in Myanmar, disrespect of freedom of association in Belarus,
and bonded and child labor in Pakistan were the reasons why
international trade union organizations initiated complaints
against the governments of these countries.
Belarus and Myanmar have more similarities because both
countries have engaged in aggressive suppression of a
democratic movement, causing the deterioration of political
freedoms. The labor rights violations in these countries are
being committed by the governments as part of this broader
suppression of democracy. By contrast, there has not been a
sharp deterioration of political participation in Pakistan, and
the labor rights violations are deeply entrenched problems
committed by the private sector, not by the government as part
of a campaign of political oppression.
Another important difference is that the magnitude of
violations of core labor standards is very different in these three
countries. In Pakistan, thousands of people were forced to work,
beaten and tortured; millions of people suffered from
"contemporary forms of slavery."'58  In Burma, thousands of
people were tortured and forced to work on exhausting
projects.'59 In Belarus, by contrast, the reported violations did
not amount to torture, physical injuries, or systematic use of
force against trade union leaders. The main problem in Belarus
is that independent trade unions have hard times registering
their organizations and their leaders are often squeezed out of
jobs."6°
The motivation for disrespect of labor standards in these
three cases is different. The main reason for violations of core
labor standards in Pakistan is economic in the sense that the
government does not allocate resources necessary to deal with
the wide-spread use of child labor and bonded labor. Belarus
repressed independent trade unions on purely political grounds
as a part of a campaign of oppressing democracy in the country.
In the case of Myanmar we can see two main reasons for using
Action.do?reference=IP/07/115&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLangua
ge=en.
158. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 147.
159. See generally Report of the Committee Set up to Consider, supra note 118.
160. See Letter from Guy Ryder, supra note 131.
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forced labor. One reason is economic-the government wanted
to build a pipeline cheaply by making people work at gunpoint.
It is quite possible that the Burmese authorities could not raise
enough money through taxes imposed on their impoverished
population and therefore resorted to forced labor. Another
reason is political-the military junta tried to consolidate its
control over the territory of Myanmar including the areas
traditionally controlled by indigenous people.
One possible explanation why Belarus was treated more
strictly on the issue of freedom of association is that this country
is much richer than Myanmar or Pakistan-GDP per capita in
Belarus is five times higher than in Myanmar and more than
two times higher than in Pakistan.'6 ' Therefore, Belarus is seen
as a country that can afford freedom of association, which is to a
certain extent a "cash" right. In further support of this point,
other former Soviet Union republics such as Uzbekistan have
virtually no independent trade unions'62 but still benefit from
the European Union's GSP arrangements. One possible
explanation is that other former Soviet Union republics are very
poor compared to Belarus'63 and therefore are not expected to
have as high a level of labor standards.
Presumably, the European Union looks hard at the
situation in Belarus because the country is located in the
geographical center of Europe and its human and labor rights
standards sharply contrast with the standards prevailing in the
rest of Europe. This is possibly a reason why there are no
sanctions against Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, which might not
look very striking in the context of their Central Asian
neighbors. Despite the fact that independent trade unions are
almost non-existent in these Asian countries,'" the European
Union has not withdrawn them from the GSP regime.
Another important factor is the expense to the European
161. Myanmar's 2007 gross domestic product, per capita, was $239, Pakistan's
$909; and Belarus' GDP per capita is $4,013. See International Monetary Fund,
Data and Statistics: Report for Selected Countries and Subjects,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx (select the
country, then select the parameter, i.e., GDP per capita, then create report).
162. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TURKMENISTAN COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78845.htm;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UZBEKISTAN COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
(2006) [hereinafter UZBEKISTAN], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2006/78848.htm.
163. Uzbekistan's 2007 gross domestic product, per capita, was $753 and
Tajikistan's $522. Data and Statistics, supra note 161.
164. See UZBEKISTAN, supra note 162.
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Union of introducing economic sanctions. The economic cost of
applying sanctions to Pakistan, with a population of about 170
million people and significant foreign direct investment, is more
significant than the expense of sanctioning Myanmar, with
population of fifty million people and almost no foreign
investment, or Belarus, with only ten million people. '65 It is
hardly possible that the European Union would introduce
sanctions against China, because that would be too costly from a
purely economic point of view.
Western nations see Pakistan as an important ally in the
war on terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attacks.
This is an important reason why the United States and the
European Union tend to turn a blind eye to human rights
violations there.'66 Moreover, the willingness of Pakistan to
engage in dialogue and to modify its legislation may have played
a decisive role in the decision not to proceed with the complaint
against Pakistan.'67 On the other hand, Belarus, with its anti-
Western policies and hypocritical president,'68 and Myanmar,
ruled by military junta backed by China, are not seen as allies
by the European Union. This certainly had an important effect
on excluding these countries from the GSP regime. However, it
is not the first time in history that geopolitical considerations
influence the GSP treatment.'69
165. Foreign direct investment was around 12.4 billion U.S. dollars in Pakistan,
around 2.7 billion U.S. dollars in Belarus, and around 5 billion U.S. dollars in
Myanmar. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT, 2006, U.N. Doc. WIR/2006, available at http://www.unctad.org
en/docs/wir2006_..en.pdf.
166. In 1998 the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan following
Pakistan's tests of nuclear explosive devices, but completely lifted sanctions on
September 22, 2001. See generally DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE REPORT INDIA AND PAKISTAN: CURRENT U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (2001).
167. Andrew Clapham & Joanna Bourke Martingnoni, Are We There Yet? In
Search of a Coherent European Union Strategy on Labour Rights and External
Trade, in SOCIAL ISSUES, GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS :
LABOUR RIGHTS AND THE EU, ILO, OECD AND WTO 279, 283 (Virginia A. Leary &
Daniel Warner eds., 2006).
168. Vitali Silitski, Contagion Deterred: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the
Former Soviet Union (the Case of Belarus), Center on Democracy, Development and
the Rule of Law Working Paper No. 66, June 2006, available at http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/21152/SilitskiNo_66.pdf.
169. During the Cold War the United States supported trade unions in
communist countries such as Solidarity in Poland, but undermined trade unions in
countries with pro-American governments such as South Korea, Chile, El Salvador,
Indonesia and others where U.S. multinationals had strong economic interests. See,
e.g., WILLIAM TAUBMAN, GLOBALISM AND ITS CRITICS: THE AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY DEBATE OF THE 1960S (1973).
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Another important difference between the Pakistan case on
the one hand and Belarus and Myanmar on the other hand is
the degree of government involvement in labor rights violations.
The Pakistan government can largely be blamed for passivity
and non-intervention into labor rights violations, while the
Belarus and Myanmar governments themselves committed
violations. Sanctions are unlikely to be effective in pushing
Pakistan to eradicate child labor in the private sector, because
ingrained cultural traditions and lack of economic opportunities
in rural areas play a more important role in this problem rather
than the "bad will" of the government. Moreover, child labor
can be lessened by a combination of foreign assistance, improved
access to education, and encouragement of cooperation with
international organizations.
As this analysis shows, although core labor standards are
supposed to be universal, economic and political predispositions
play a more important role than black-letter law in decisions on
withdrawing GSP preferences. The GSP of the European Union
as a matter of fact depends on a number of additional factors,
such as the economic importance of a target country, geopolitical
considerations, regional context, and the level of cooperation
between the country and the sanctioner.
The next Part offers some general conclusions on the
effectiveness of trade sanctions and the importance of
distinguishing between economic and political justifications for
disrespect of core labor standards and human rights.
V. EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS
As a general rule, sanctions are deployed by countries in
pursuit of policy goals related to warfare or national security
and might be an effort to destabilize foreign governments. 70
Sanctions have also been used to protect human rights, to halt
nuclear proliferation, to settle expropriation claims, and to
combat international terrorism. 71
Imposing sanctions for violations of labor rights is more
difficult than for "regular" gross human rights violations such as
torture or extrajudicial killings. Even the detailed obligations
under ILO conventions allow for a great deal of flexibility in
170. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 5-6 (2d ed.
1990).
171. Id. at 7.
2008]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
implementation and diversity among countries. The
international standards recognize only the principles, which are
always country-specific. That leaves room for purely political
discretion of those who implement these principles and those
who sanction their violation. For instance, evaluating freedom
of association using a uniform standard is complicated, because
it is difficult to design an absolute rather than a relative set of
specific measurable standards. 17 2 The "ideal" standard has to be
applied in a broader context taking into account the country's
level of economic development, its political and economic
importance, and its attitude towards the sanctioner.
As it has been shown, the European Union uses its GSP
regime in a limited manner to sanction countries that violate
the core labor standards. Exclusion of countries from the GSP
for violations of labor standards can lead to economic losses and
reputational damages for the sanctioned country. Sanctions can
also send a strong signal that a country is potentially a bad
investment destination.'73 No country likes bad international
publicity. Even if a country has been traditionally considered a
violator of human rights, it usually undertakes at least nominal
steps to show willingness to cooperate and to show that the
alleged wrongdoings are not a matter of substantive violations,
but a result of different understanding of the standards or
politically motivated paternalism of other countries.'74
Empirical studies suggest that economic sanctions seem to
be more effective when aimed against erstwhile friends and
close trading partners.'7 5 This is not the case with Belarus and
Myanmar, which are not allies of the West. Both Belarus and
Myanmar have a powerful non-Western "big brother," who turns
a blind eye to violations of labor rights and human rights
violations in general and provides economic support. Russia
traditionally backed the current political regime in Belarus.'76
172. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MONITORING INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS: QUALITY OF INFORMATION 18 (Margaret Hilton ed., 2003).
173. See Compa & Vogt, supra note 3, at 204.
174. In response to the withdrawal of Belarus from the EU's GSP, President
Lukashenka declared that the real reason for withdrawal of Belarus from the
preferable treatment was that the European Union could not compete against
Belarusian goods. Interfax, Lukashenka: Evrosoyuz ne vyderzhal konkurentsii s
Belarusyu na svoikh rynkakh [Lukashenka: European Union Could Not Sustain
Competition with Belarus on its Internal Market], Dec. 29, 2006, (Russian)
http://news.tut.by/79889.html.
175. See HUFBAUER ETAL., supra note 170, at 104.
176. Russia supplied almost 60% of imports in 2005 and is by far the most
important source of imports to Belarus. It provides the raw materials such as fuel,
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China is the key trade, investment, and political partner of
Myanmar' 77 In January 2007, China and Russia vetoed a U.N.
Security Council resolution proposed by the United States that
criticized Myanmar, although the resolution received support
from a majority of members.'
The examples of Myanmar and Belarus show that powerful
economic sponsors of undemocratic regimes can render any
economic sanctions meaningless. This is in line with the
existing empirical studies suggesting that in order to be
effective, the aim of sanctions should be relatively modest; the
target country should be much smaller than the country
imposing sanctions, economically weak, and politically
unstable.'79 None of that applies to Belarus or Myanmar, where
political regimes seem to retain an iron grip on society. These
countries are a subject of concern primarily because of their
suppression of political freedom, which goes beyond the labor
rights violations.
As the Myanmar and Belarus cases show, sanctions are
easier to impose when the target is a pariah state with very few
economic interests, such as direct investment of the sanctioners.
Then it is possible to achieve two major goals relatively
cheaply-to demonstrate commitment to international labor
standards and to punish an unfriendly regime. 8° However, even
in this case, sanctions might be enough to harm people in these
countries, but not to fix the governmental policy. 8'
metals, and chemicals required by Belarusian industry. See Economist Intelligence
Unit, Country Profile of Belarus 30 (2007).
177. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Myanmar 14 (2007).
178. China and Russia Veto US/UK-backed Security Council Draft Resolution
on Myanmar, UN NEWS CENTRE, Jan. 12, 2007, http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=21228&Cr=myanmar&Crl#.
179. See generally HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 170 (studying 116 cases of
economic sanctions and deriving general principles for successful imposition of
sanctions).
180. However, sanctions are not necessarily cheap. For instance, the issue of
effectiveness of sanctions has also been considered by the U.S. Congress, which
mentioned that the use of sanctions has translated into billions of dollars in lost
opportunities for U.S. exporters to the benefit of European, Japanese, and other
foreign competitors, whose home governments have not bound them by similar
sanctions. See U.S. House of Representatives, Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade
Sanctions. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways
And Means, May 27, 1999. U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash., D.C., 2000, at 3.
181. Belarusian businessmen claim than the withdrawal of Belarus from the
GSP will hurt small businesses in the first instance, and not the government.
Biznesmeny Vzyvaiut k ES [The Businessmen Appeal to the EU], BELORUSSKI
PARTISAN, Apr. 19, 2007, (Russian) http://www.belaruspartisan.org/bp-
forte/?page=100&news= 12023.
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Sanctions also lessen the importance of multilateral
cooperation with non-democratic regimes, which often is
difficult to obtain. The target countries may become even more
dependent on their "big brothers" which support their
repression of democracy and human rights."8 2 For instance,
there is an ongoing debate in Europe over whether it is better to
isolate the Belarusian regime or to propose cooperation by
exposing officials of the country to better standards."8 3 Another
related problem is commitment-once launched, sanctions are
very difficult to terminate, with domestic politics militating
against an administration's attempt to "back down" or as a
gesture of support of a repressive regime."'
One general concern is that withdrawing trade benefits
from countries violating core labor standards on political
grounds can hurt the people in the name of whose rights the
sanctions are introduced. Policies to isolate countries in which
human rights are violated and to exclude them "from the
prosperity that accompanies open trade may well cause human
rights to deteriorate.' ' .5  It is therefore preferable to use more
"smart sanctions," i.e., those targeting particular persons and
companies, as opposed to blunt sanctions imposed on the whole
country. 18 6
Skeptics argue that trade sanctions may produce a perverse
effect and trade liberalization is a better alternative policy to
182. To illustrate, a few months after the United States introduced economic
sanctions against Belarus for violations of human rights in 2007, Russia provided
several billion dollars in loans to Belarus to eliminate the effect of these sanctions.
See Elena Lashkina, Tsena Druzhby. Viktor Zubkov Osudil SSHA za
Ekonomicheskie Sanktsii Protiv Minska. (The Price of Friendship. Victor Zubkov
condemned the United States Sanctions against Minsk.), Rossiiskaia Gazeta No.
4554, Dec. 27, 2007 (Russian).
183. See Interfax, Ex-Prezident Litvy prosit ne Izolirovat Belarus [Ex-President
of Lithuania Calls Not to Isolate Belarus], Mar. 9, 2007, (Russian)
http://bdg.by/news/news.htm?101744,1.
184. Donald L. Losman, The Case Against Sanctions: Good Intentions Gone Bad;
Punitive Trade Embargoes Are Appealing, but They Don't Achieve Our Goals, WASH.
POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at C3.
185. Alan 0. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic
Perspective, in 5 WORLD TRADE FORUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 69, 77 (Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds.,
2001).
186. For example, the European Union refuses to reduce prohibitively high visa
fees for Belarusian citizens, which helps the policy of self-isolation from the West
pursued by the Belarusian regime. See EU Business, EU Commissioner says no
plans to cut visa fees for Belarus, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-
euI1208835122.63
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combat labor rights violations such as child labor.'87 However,
trade sanctions may have other effects that go beyond the target
country. For instance, they can contribute to the international
definition, promulgation, recognition, and domestic
internalization of human rights norms.'88 Sanctions can be an
effective way to demonstrate commitment to a particular set of
values, such as core labor standards or fundamental human
rights. Imposition of sanctions may also deter other countries
that would think twice before committing violations.
Unilateral sanctions-even when imposed by the largest
economies in the world-face far more difficult challenges in an
increasingly integrated international economy. Despite the
sanctions introduced by the European Union, the situations
with freedom of association in Belarus and forced labor in
Myanmar have not improved. Although sanctions prove to have
limited effectiveness against the target countries, they might
help develop a system of protection based on international labor
standards. The very efforts to keep labor standards in the
international spotlight, blame the governments, and morally
support the oppressed groups are important to prevent further
deterioration of human rights in target countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Linking trade and labor standards is one of the few ways to
apply "hard" law as opposed to political pressure to make
countries comply with their international obligations to respect
core labor standards. In using this linkage it is important to
distinguish why the countries adopted the policies that violated
core labor rights. If the motivation is economic, the mere threat
of sanctions may be enough for the states to comply or at least to
cooperate because of the states' concerns about international
reputation and economic damages that result from sanctions.
If the violations are motivated primarily by political
considerations, it is very unlikely that the sanctions will be
effective, unless they are introduced by a state that is a major
trading partner of the violating country or a sponsor of the
regime. Sanctions against politically motivated violators most
probably will not change their practices, although the attention
187. Sarbajit Chaudhuri, Trade Sanctions and Child Labour: Quest for an
Alternative Policy 19 (June 2003) (unpublished paper available through Social
Science Research Network), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=426821.
188. See Cleveland, supra note 11, at 6.
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of the international community can be helpful to prevent further
deterioration and to support the oppressed groups. Sanctions
can have other important effects, which go beyond their impact
on a target country, as they deter other potential violators and
demonstrate a commitment to the fundamental labor rights.
This should be taken into account when decisions whether to
impose sanctions are made.
